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Abstract 
Animal replaceability is supposed to be a feature of some consequentialist theories, like Utilitarianism. Roughly, 
an animal is replaceable if it is permissible to kill it because the disvalue thereby caused will be compensated by 
the value of a new animal’s life. This is specially troubling since the conditions for such compensation seem easily 
attainable by improved forms of raising and killing animals. Thus, grounding a strong moral status of animals in 
such theories is somewhat compromised. As is, consequently, their position as an alternative to rights-based the-
ories in animal ethics. Recognising this, some utilitarians tried to disassociate utilitarianism and replaceability. I will 
here add my voice to this project. However, instead of seeing the culprit in the usual suspects (hedonism, maximi-
sation or the total view), I advance a new proposal. After identifying that the compensating value for a disvaluable 
action has to be its consequence, I present a restriction on consequences: consequences of sequences of actions 
cannot be consequences of the isolated actions in the sequences. Given this, the main argument is simple: killing 
an animal is permissible only if the the value of the new animal’s life is a consequence of the killing; but this value 
is a consequence of a sequence of actions which involves the killing plus some additional actions; therefore, since, 
via the restriction, such value is not a consequence of the killing, it is irrelevant to its normative status. I then 
present two further motivations for the restriction: firstly, it prevents the value of conditional actions from trivially 
influencing the value of the actions on which they are conditional; secondly, it is useful – even if not a complete 
solution – to reply other objections to consequentialism: the accordion effect of action and the cluelessness prob-
lem. I finally consider a couple of objections. 
I The Replaceability Argument 
This is what I take to be the best available version of the replaceability argument (RA):1 
(1) If killing animals2 whose future life would have a positive value will lead to the 
creation of other animals which would not exist otherwise and whose lives will 
have at least the same value as the one lost with the killed animals, then such 
killing is permissible. 
(2) Killing this animal exemplifies the antecedent of (1). 
 
1 See Miguel 2016 for a contrast between this and two other versions of the argument. 
2 I use ‘animals’ to abbreviate ‘non-human animals’. Although the RA may apply to humans too, I choose to focus 
on animal replaceability mainly because of its greater practical importance. 
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(3) It is permissible to kill this animal. 
A theory that implies this argument is not just incapable of a strong moral protection of 
animals’ lives – like a right to life – but, in addition, allows killing them given conditions 
which seem rather easy to satisfy. Even if most animals presently raised for some purpose 
that implies killing them do not enjoy good lives and, as such, are not individuals which 
make (2) true, some present or improved forms of raising and killing animals may find sup-
port in the RA. For example, according to the RA, the conscientious small farmer who raises 
animals for food is killing them permissibly. 
In general, moral theories that require promoting overall value above individual harms and 
benefits seem to imply the RA. As a standard example of such theories, Utilitarianism has 
been criticised for recognising an inadequate moral status of animals and, relatedly, for not 
grounding ethical vegetarianism. If this is sound, Utilitarianism falls behind competing views 
in animal ethics that tick those marks, like rights-based theories. 
Nevertheless, I must note that some authors have defended non-standard utilitarian views 
that do not imply the RA, but I cannot assess their merits here. Instead, I will propose a 
novel way to cut the link between Utilitarianism and replaceability – one that restricts the 
notion of consequence and maintains the core properties of the standard theory. 
II Necessary Conditions for the Compensating Value 
Suppose that some value, v, is not a consequence of some action, φ. Then v does not deter-
mine, or contributes to determine, the normative status of φ. Therefore, when a value com-
pensates a disvalue which is a consequence of φ, the former must be a consequence of φ 
too. This means that the success of the RA implies that the value of the new animal’s life – 
the candidate to compensating value – must be a consequence of killing another animal – 
the action with a disvaluable consequence.3 However, as I will argue, there are good reasons 
not to regard such value as a consequence of the killing. But before moving on to this, let 
me illustrate why the consequentialist is committed with this tight relation between the 
compensating value and the value it is to compensate. 
 
3 This action may have, and normally has, valuable consequences too. Throughout I use ‘disvaluable action’ just to 
mean the action with the relevant disvaluable consequence, which is compatible with it being, sometimes, 
permissible. 
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In November 2017 a lynx that had escaped from an animal park in Wales was shot dead. 
Imagine that right after this a new lynx was born at the park and that his life was at least as 
valuable as the killed lynx’s future life would be if he had not been killed. Thus, the balance 
between the value of the new lynx’s life and that lost with the killing would not be negative. 
Yet, the value of the new lynx’s life does not compensate the killing in the required sense 
aimed at by the RA – it does not make it permissible. Why? Since the new lynx’s existence 
is independent of the other lynx’s death, whatever value his life has, it is not a consequence 
of the killing. Therefore, such value cannot determine the normative status of the killing. In 
addition, this example brings to light that, when the disvaluable action is independent of 
the alleged compensating value, its omission would have made things better. 
Thus, besides the requisite of non-negative net value, we have two other necessary condi-
tions for the compensating value: on the one hand, it has to be a consequence of the dis-
valuable action (consequentialism); on the other hand, the omission of the disvaluable ac-
tion and the performance of that which leads to the compensating value has to be 
inaccessible to the agent (maximisation). In sum, utilitarian value compensation requires: 
(i) that an action ψ brings about a value at least as good as the one lost with a disvaluable 
action φ; (ii) that the value of ψ is a consequence of φ; and (iii) that performing φ and ψ 
maximises the good. 
To my knowledge, everyone discussing this matter has been accepting that the RA satisfies 
(ii).4 I think that this is wrong and will argue for a restriction according to which (ii) fails. 
III A Restriction on Consequences 
III.a Blocking the Replaceability Argument 
Consider the following restriction on consequences: 
(R) Consequences of sequences of actions cannot be consequences of the isolated actions 
in the sequences.5 
 
4 To name a few, see Singer (2011), Regan (2004), Višak (2013, 2016), Chappell (2015) and Delon (2016). 
5 I am shamelessly applying to my needs Diogo Santos’ “Non-disaggregation Principle” (ms.), which he uses to deal 
with the cluelessness problem (see the end of III.b). After reading Bratman (2006) on the connections between the 
accordion effect and Hart and Honoré’s (1959) Voluntary Intervention Principle, I realised that (R) also has some 
connections with that principle, but I cannot explore them here. 
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I will now show that (R) blocks the RA. Recall premiss (1): If killing animals whose future life 
would have a positive value will lead to the creation of other animals which would not exist 
otherwise and whose lives will have at least the same value as the one lost with the killed 
animals, then such killing is permissible. For this to be true and, as I have argued, faithful to 
Utilitarianism, ‘lead to’ must relate the killing with its consequences. However, killing ani-
mals, by itself, does not “lead to the creation of other animals which …” Some additional 
actions are required, like making animals reproduce, taking good care of the newborn, and 
so on. Thus, the plausible sense in which killing animals leads to such and such is by being 
one action among a sequence of actions which has that consequence. Yet, in this sense, (R) 
tells us that the value of the new animal’s life is not a consequence of the killing (nor of the 
other isolated actions). According to consequentialism, then, the new animal’s life is irrele-
vant to the normative status of the killing. Therefore, (1) is false, for although the killing 
leads (in the specified sense) to the valuable state of affairs, this has no bearing on its per-
missibility.6 
An obvious question now arises: why should a consequentialist accept (R)? Well, if one cares 
about stopping the RA, then this already counts in its favour. But of course that this alone 
will seem rather ad hoc. Moreover, without any further support, (R) is also too strong a 
claim just to deal with a problem for utilitarians concerned with the ethics of killing animals. 
Nevertheless, I believe that we can say more in favour of (R). 
III.b Two Further Motivations 
Firstly, without a restriction like (R) the consequentialist allows the value of conditional ac-
tions to trivially influence the value of actions on which they are conditional. And I think 
that this is untenable. Consider an example of value sabotage. You did an intuitively per-
missible action like saving a person’s life. Now suppose that someone killed another person 
on the condition that your saving was successful. Then your saving may not be permissible 
after all, for its normative status depends on the overall value of those two actions. It is odd 
that the value of an action depends not just on the things that it brings about, but also on 
the things chosen to be brought about by it (mutatis mutandis for value improvement, 
where the conditional action allegedly improves the condition action). To be clear, in these 
 
6 Were the argument stated with the consequence relation, (R) implies that the antecedent of (1) is false, making 
premiss (2) false. Interestingly, Persson (2017, 78-9) agrees that raising good lives cannot compensate killing good 
lives, “for while the latter could be done by means of a single act, the former cannot.” But Persson leaves unclear 
why performing various acts cannot compensate a single one. My proposal is a step to explain this. 
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cases, conditionalising is itself a result of agency. Therefore, contrarily to non-agential con-
ditional events, the conditional action can occur without the condition action. 
This way of influencing the normative status of actions is too trivial to be acceptable. Even 
if every non-agential consequences of one’s action would be good/bad, conditional actions 
could always overturn the balance. So, unless one is prepared to abandon a view of agency 
as being tightly connected to individual responsibility, consequences of other actions should 
not be treated like an action’s non-agential consequences. 
Consequentialists, then, can make a relevant distinction between consequences of se-
quences of actions and consequence-related events tracing back to a single action.7 (R) does 
just this by preventing that consequences of sequences of actions bear on the normative 
status of the isolated actions. Still, (R) does not depart from the basic idea that, to evaluate 
an action, consequences are all that matter. In this way, although (R) restricts the received 
view about what counts as consequences of an action, we remain on consequentialist 
ground.8 
Secondly, (R) has other useful applications for consequentialists. I will point out two.9 The 
first regards the so called “accordion effect” of action. In brief, the worry is that the same 
set of events can be appropriately described in various ways that are such that the action 
in one description contains some of its consequences in another description. Adapting an 
example from Miller (1987), consider these two descriptions of what Jones did: 
(a) Jones tells a lie. 
(b) Jones saves a life. 
If (a) and (b) are correct descriptions of Jones’ action, then, assuming that the relevant value 
is in (b), consequentialists can only account for the normative status of the action via de-
scription (a); in contrast, non-consequentialists will care if (b) follows (or not) some rule. If 
 
7 E.g. pushing a person on the street is not permissible because someone decides to benefit that person if you push 
her; however, it would be if, say, by pushing her, a bullet happens to miss her. In the latter case, but not in the 
former, the valuable consequence is a result of your action alone. Note also that all I said is compatible with both 
single or multiple agent sequences of actions. 
8 Smart (1956) distinguished “extreme” and “restricted” Utilitarianism by, respectively, having a focus on single 
actions or on classes of actions. My suggestion is similar, but I am distinguishing single actions from sequences 
thereof and disregarding their being subsumed under a rule. Thus, in Smart’s sense, Utilitarianism with (R) is still 
extreme. 
9 The aim here is just to motivate (R)’s acceptance beyond the RA and not to exhaust its usefulness. But I also 
envisage other applications, e.g. to a more commonsensical consequentialist account of blameworthiness. 
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this is sound, then, as Oldenquist (1966, 183) puts the problem, “whether we appeal to rules 
or to consequences to determine the rightness or wrongness of a particular action is of no 
moral significance.” That is, the notion of consequence is left without distinctive normative 
relevance. 
Given (R), however, the accordion can only be stretched so much: although we can agree 
that, say, 
(*) Jones deceives the intending murderer 
is also a correct description of what he did, we cannot say the same of description (b). The 
reason is that (b), but not (*), forces us to recognise multiple actions – whether or not a life 
is saved also depends on the intending murderer’s action. Thus, (R) prevents the accordion 
from stretching beyond descriptions involving single actions. 
Finally, another useful application of (R) pertains the cluelessness objection (Lenman 2000). 
In brief, the objection is the following: since the consequences of our actions are normally 
spread in time and space in a way that surpasses our knowledge, then we have no clue 
about what we ought to do. What seems to be a perfectly permissible action, like sparing 
the life of a pregnant woman, might actually be impermissible because such action happens 
to have the consequence of not preventing the birth of a future terrible dictator and all his 
atrocities. 
Again, with (R) at disposal, the consequentialist has a line of response: consequences of the 
dictator’s actions are not consequences of sparing his ancestor. We remain clueless about 
the consequences of sequences of actions that contain our actions as parts. Yet, given that 
such consequences are not consequences of our actions alone, we are not required to know 
them (we could not). And since they have no bearing on the normative status of our actions, 
ignoring them does not imply that we are in the dark about what we alone ought to do.10 
 
10 There is a reply if we can be clueless even if there are no sequences of actions involved. But the burden of proof 
is with those who think that single actions can have massive causal ramifications and that most of our actions are 
like that. But note that the claim here is modest: if (R) can mitigate this problem (as well as the accordion effect), 




One tempting objection to my way of blocking the RA is that, somehow, we can automate 
the sequence of actions that together lead to the new animal’s valuable life. In this way, it 
seems that there would be a single action, e.g. the press of a button, that leads to the killing 
of one animal and to the raising of another satisfying the relevant conditions. Thus, the 
value of what would otherwise be a sequence of actions is, in the automation case, the 
value of a single action. Since this, apparently, would not involve a sequence of actions, (R) 
would not apply and, therefore, it seems that the killing would be permissible (given that 
the press of the button would).11 
This objection fails because it overlooks one crucial action (or sequence), namely, setting 
up the automation, making it seem that (R) would not apply when in fact it does. Hence, 
the valuable state of affairs would still be a consequence of a sequence of actions. 
Perhaps one serious objection is that the RA can be restated in a way that bypasses (R). One 
might say that it does not matter whether or not the valuable state of affairs is a conse-
quence of the killing, for as long as the whole sequence brings about such state of affairs, 
then, replacing an animal, that is, the whole sequence, is permissible. In other words, we 
shift the evaluation focus from actions to sequences of actions. And since I do not deny that 
the valuable state of affairs is a consequence of the sequence, then it seems that I have to 
agree that it determines (or contributes to) the normative status of the sequence. 
But is this an objection to my proposal? The goal was to argue that, contrarily to widespread 
agreement, standard act-Utilitarianism does not imply the RA. After all, this was the target 
of those who used the RA against Utilitarianism (e.g. Pluhar 1982; Regan 2004). To achieve 
that goal I proposed a novel way, via (R), to stop the RA. But I did not claim that every utili-
tarian view with (R) stops the RA. It may well be the case that a global utilitarian view, that 
is, one which allows every sort of thing as evaluative focus, implies the RA. At the very least, 
the objector has to argue that a utilitarian should accept sequences of actions as evaluative 
focus. This comes with difficulties. 
The said shift of evaluative focus requires completing and making sense of the new, refor-
mulated principle: 
 
11 I had thought of this objection before, but I thank Melinda Roberts for mentioning it to me and thereby 
confirming my intuition that it was something I had to address. 
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(C*) A sequence of actions is permissible iff it brings about more value than any other 
alternative ________ available to the agent. 
The natural move is to fill the blank with ‘sequence’, but do agents have alternative se-
quences of actions to choose from? Maybe just in single agent sequences, for an agent can-
not choose a sequence that involves other people’s actions (otherwise he would know how 
others would act).12 And while single agent sequences are enough to formulate the RA (but 
seriously limiting its application), we would still need a systematic account of the normative 
relation between sequences and the actions composing them. Without such account, that 
the consequences of a sequence are good overall is not enough for its permissibility, since 
it may be the case that a single impermissible act stains the sequence of which it is part. 
V Conclusion 
The value of the new animal’s life should be a consequence of killing another animal if the 
RA is to be successful. Yet, I argued that such value, given the restriction on consequences I 
presented, is not a consequence of the killing. Therefore, the first premiss of the RA is false. 
Since that restriction is quite strong and, apparently, ad hoc, I offered two distinct motiva-
tions for it: one axiological and one of usefulness. I then considered and replied two plausi-
ble objections, the last of which hints at further work on coordinated actions and on the 
normative relation between sequences and the actions composing them. 
I should conclude by stressing that even though I could not assess here the relative merits 
of others ways to disassociate Utilitarianism and replaceability, my proposal does not give 
up of any of the usual suspects like those other ways do – hedonism, maximisation or the 
total view. And while I am sure that other objections might be raised, I think that this utili-
tarian proposal against the RA is worthy of being discussed in more detail.13 
 
 
12 What about coordinated actions? Here seems possible to choose a sequence involving other people’s actions 
because everyone agreed to act in such and such manner and so the agent seems reasonably informed in a way 
that does not preclude the sequence from being an alternative action. I have no answer to this. 
13 Meanwhile, following comments from Theron Pummer, Bruno Jacinto, José Mestre and Pedro Galvão, to all of 
whom I am thankful, I became aware of other difficulties, and also possible developments, of the view presented 
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